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The Creeping Federalization of
Wealth-Transfer Law
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This paper surveys areas of federalization of wealth-transfer
law. Federal authorities have little experience in making law that
governs wealth transfers, because that function is traditionally
within the province of state law. Although state wealth-transfer law
has undergone significant modernization over the last few decades,
all three branches of the federal government—legislative, judicial,
and executive—have increasingly gone their own way. Lack of
experience, and in many cases lack of knowledge, have not been a
deterrent, and the results have been mostly disturbing.
The paper covers these topics: federal preemption of several
areas of state law, the development of federal common law as a
sometime substitute for state law, the federal tax exemption for
perpetual trusts, and the right of posthumously conceived children
of assisted reproduction to Social Security survivor benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Federal law increasingly departs from state law when governing
wealth transfers.2 The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) has taken notice
of the phenomenon by issuing a position paper on the development.3 The
ULC urges Congress and federal agencies, when considering laws and
regulations that potentially conflict with state law, to do the following
(among others):4
• Carefully evaluate the way in which state law addresses the issue under
consideration.
• Determine the extent to which states face differing needs, circumstances,
and requirements in responding to the issue under consideration.
• Exercise restraint when legislating in areas in which the states have
historically played a primary role . . . by taking action which preempts
state law only when necessary to achieve objectives that cannot be
reasonably achieved through alternative policies.
• When preempting state law other than to prevent direct and
irreconcilable conflict with federal law, specify as expressly as possible
the extent to which state law is superseded or preserved.

Among the ULC’s list of factors that favor states retaining autonomy is that
“state law historically has primarily occupied the field.”5 An area of state
law that has primarily occupied the field is wealth-transfer law. Yet, as we
shall see, federal law sometimes disrespects state law that has been
promulgated only after having undergone the thoughtful deliberative
processes of the ULC and then been enacted by a state legislature, typically

1
By federal law, I mean acts of Congress, decisions of federal courts, especially the
Supreme Court, and regulations issued by federal agencies.
2
Throughout the text, I use the term “wealth-transfer law” as meaning the law that
governs donative transfers by wills, intestacy, and will substitutes. A will substitute, also
called a nonprobate transfer, “is an arrangement respecting property or contract rights that
are established during the donor’s life, under which (1) the right to possession or enjoyment
of the property or to a contractual payment shifts outside of probate to the donee at the
donor’s death; and (2) substantial lifetime rights of dominion, control, possession, or
enjoyment are retained by the donor.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 (2003) [hereinafter PROPERTY RESTATEMENT]. Will substitutes
include revocable trusts, life insurance, pension and employee benefit accounts, joint tenancy
and other forms of undivided ownership with right of survivorship, multiple-party accounts,
payable-on-death arrangements, annuities with a death benefit, Totten trusts, and similar
arrangements.
3
See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, PRINCIPLES ON FEDERALISM, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/federalism%20and%20state%20law/2013aug_F
ederalism%20Principles.pdf (2013) (last visited Sept. 28, 2013). The ULC has not yet
decided how to transmit the statement to federal authorities. E-mail of Oct. 22, 2013, to the
author from John Sebert, ULC Executive Director.
4
See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 2.
5
Id. at 4. See also ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY
OF THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION ch.14 (2013).
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after extensive review and support by the relevant section of the state bar.
Although my purpose is to collect in one place various areas in which
federal law, not state law, governs wealth transfers, I make no claim that
the list is comprehensive.6 Because this is a survey article, each topic merits
deeper investigation than I present here.
Parts I through IV discuss federal law that preempts state law
concerning the validity of beneficiary designations under federally
authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers, i.e., state law concerning
divorce-revocation, elective share, mental incapacity, undue influence, and
defective execution. These Parts also discuss the application of federal
common law as a possible substitute for preempted state law.
Parts V, VI, and VII explore discrete topics. Part V takes up federally
authorized military wills, whose execution overrides state will-execution
law. Part VI points to Congress’s promotion of perpetual trusts by its
enactment of the GST exemption without any durational limit, which led
states to repeal or modify their perpetuity laws to allow such trusts. Part VII
addresses the rights of posthumously conceived children of assisted
reproduction to Social Security survivor benefits. In this one case, Congress
has embraced, not preempted, state law. Years ago, Congress incorporated
the deceased wage earner’s state intestacy rules as its standard for awarding
benefits. Because posthumous conception is such a new phenomenon,
however, many states have not yet addressed intestacy rights for such
children and the states that have done so have adopted diverse rules. The
result is that the children of some but not all wage earners will benefit.

I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE DIVORCE-REVOCATION LAWS7
Revocation of a will on the basis of changed circumstances has an
esteemed pedigree in the law. At common law, a premarital will of a
woman was revoked upon marriage and a premarital will of a man was
revoked upon marriage and birth of issue.8 In the twentieth century, that
common-law principle was replaced by revocation on divorce statutes. The
1969 Uniform Probate Code (1969 UPC) provided that any provision in a
will in favor of a former spouse was presumptively revoked upon divorce.9

6
For example, except for note 24 infra, I have left the slayer rule out of my discussion,
as that topic is covered in Professor Langbein’s paper. See John H. Langbein, Destructive
Federal Preemption of State Wealth Transfer Law in Beneficiary Designation Cases:
Hillman Doubles Down on Egelhoff, 66 VAND. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2014),
prepublication draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330817. I have also left out state
rules regarding antilapse and simultaneous death, as those topics are covered in T.P.
Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 189-90 (2004).
7
My treatment of the divorce-revocation topic is quite brief. John Langbein covers the
topic in greater depth in another paper in this symposium issue. See Langbein, supra note
6.
8
See 1 THOMAS JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 152 (2d Am. ed. 1849).
9
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1969).
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When the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was revised in 1990, the
nonprobate revolution was in full flower. Much if not most wealth today
passes on death outside of probate in will-substitute arrangements such as
revocable trusts, joint ownership by right of survivorship, and life insurance
and pension arrangements. The 1990 UPC revisions took the logical step
of extending the revocation on divorce provision of the 1969 UPC to
nonprobate transfers.10 The UPC now provides that divorce or annulment
of a marriage presumptively revokes “any revocable disposition or
appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his [or her]
former spouse.” About thirty percent of the states—mainly states that have
adopted the UPC reforms—have now extended their divorce-revocation
law to nonprobate transfers.11 The American Law Institute (ALI)’s
Restatement of Property extends, as a common-law rule, the divorcerevocation rule to nonprobate transfers.12
A variety of nonprobate transfers are authorized or regulated by federal
law. Anticipating the possibility that the divorce-revocation rule might be
preempted by federal law, the UPC provides that the former spouse who
receives benefits must pay them to the person who would have been
entitled to them were the revocation rule not preempted. The UPC’s postdistribution rule is nothing more than a codified form of the age-old
constructive-trust remedy used in equity to prevent unjust enrichment.13
As a result of a pair of decisions of the Supreme Court, Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff (2001)14 and Hillman v. Maretta (2013),15 both the revocation rule
and the post-distribution rule are preempted with respect to any federally
authorized or regulated nonprobate transfer.16 In Hillman, Justice

10

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804.
Divorce-revocation statutes extend to nonprobate transfers in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Professors Sterk
and Leslie point out that in the states whose divorce-revocation statute is limited to wills, “a
provision in the divorce decree that voids the designation [in favor of the former spouse]
may be given effect.” Stewart E. Sterk & Melanie B. Leslie, Accidental Inheritance:
Retirement Accounts and the Hidden Law of Succession, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ___, ___
(forthcoming 2014).
12
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 4.1 cmt. p (2003).
13
See Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses
Cash In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISAGoverned Employee Benefit Plans, 106 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2007). As codified in the
Restatement of Restitution, a constructive trust arises when “a defendant is unjustly enriched
by the acquisition of title to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in
violation of the claimant's rights.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 55(1) (2011).
14
532 U.S. 141 (2001).
15
569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1943 (2013).
16
The Washington divorce-revocation rule that was preempted in Egelhoff (WASH.
REV. CODE § 11.01.010) is similar to the UPC’s divorce-revocation rule (UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-804(b)(1)(A)). The Virginia post-distribution rule that was preempted in Hillman
11
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Sotomayor, speaking for the Court, held that the federal statute in question,
the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA),17 and
in effect any federal statute, that provides that pension, insurance, or any
other proceeds are to be paid to the named beneficiary means that the
proceeds “belong to the named beneficiary and no other.”18 The Virginia
statute’s post-distribution rule—which is similar to the UPC’s postdistribution rule—is preempted: It “interferes with Congress’ scheme,19
because it directs that the proceeds actually ‘belong’ to someone other than
the named beneficiary by creating a cause of action for their recovery by a
third party.”20 Had these state laws not been preempted, federally
authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers would only be affected in
those states whose divorce-revocation law reaches nonprobate transfers that
are not federally authorized or regulated.21

(VA. CODE ANN. § 20.111.1D) is similar to the UPC’s post-distribution rule (UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-804(i)(2)).
17
5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq.
18
Hillman, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1955 (emphasis added). State insurance codes
have similar provisions. For example, the Insurance Codes of Michigan and Minnesota
provide that the proceeds of a life insurance policy are payable to the named beneficiary. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2207 (life insurance proceeds “shall be payable to the person or
persons for whose benefit the insurance was procured”); MINN. STAT. § 61A.12 (“the
beneficiary shall be entitled to the proceeds”). Both states also have a divorce-revocation
statute similar to the Virginia statute in Hillman. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2807; MINN.
STAT. § 524.2-804. No state court in either state has ever as much as hinted that the
Insurance Code trumps the divorce-revocation statute on the dubious ground that that the
proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.
19
The Court’s emphasis on “Congress’ scheme” is part of the Court’s move from
deciding preemption questions on the basis of the literal text of a federal statute (called
“textualism”) to whether the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives
of the federal statute (called “obstacle preemption”). See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and
Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 n.38 (2013) (“[T]he Court’s recent decision in [Hillman]
rested squarely on obstacle preemption . . . .”). Although obstacle preemption was first
adopted by a unanimous Court in N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995) (“We simply must go beyond the unhelpful
text [of ERISA] and look instead to the objectives of [ERISA] as a guide to the scope of the
state law that Congress understood would survive.”), the obstacle-preemption theory is
questioned by some current justices, notably Justice Thomas, who prefers to decide
preemption questions on the basis of textualism. See Meltzer, supra, at 35-43.
In the earlier Egelhoff case, the Court relied on ERISA’s broad preemption clause,
which provides that state laws are superceded “insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any [ERISA-covered] employee benefit plan.” ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(2006) (emphasis added). For discussion of the Court’s analysis in Egelhoff, see Langbein,
supra note 6, prepublication draft at 10-15.
20
Hillman, 569 U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1952. The Court did not base preemption on
administrative convenience, because the rule “takes effect only after benefits have been paid,
and so would not necessarily impact the Government’s distribution of insurance proceeds.”
Id. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1950. The Court based preemption on the dubious “belong to no
other” interpretation of the federal statute. See supra text accompanying note 18.
21
For a list of those states, see supra note 11.
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Is there any chance that the gap in federal law will be filled by a federal
common law divorce-revocation or post-distribution rule? In an oftenquoted pre-Egelhoff case, the Fourth Circuit provided this guidance:
Federal courts “should apply common-law doctrines best suited to
furthering the goals of ERISA [and presumably FEGLIA and any other
federal statute at issue].”22 The Supreme Court has decided that the goal of
FEGLIA, and by extension ERISA, is that the insurance proceeds must go
to the designated beneficiary “and no other.” The strength of the Court’s
opinion in Hillman makes it unrealistic to think that the Court would allow
federal common law to change that result. Although Justice Breyer,
dissenting in Egelhoff, could find no rationale for preempting the
Washington divorce-revocation statute,23 he was silent regarding the
Virginia divorce-post-distribution statute in Hillman. Neither he nor any
other justice dissented in Hillman.24
By adopting the dubious “belong to no other” interpretation of federal
law,25 the Supreme Court has destroyed the UPC’s intent-

22

Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1453 (4th Cir. 1992).
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 154 (dissenting opinion) (“No one could claim that ERISA
pre-empts the entire field of state law governing inheritance.”) (emphasis added and
omitted).
24
The preemption of the divorce-revocation law invites comparison with the slayer
rule. Both rules are in the “probably would have revoked” category, but the post-Egelhoff
slayer decisions of the lower federal courts prevent the validly designated beneficiary—the
slayer—from taking or keeping the property. See, e.g., In re Estate of Burklund, 2013 WL
327622 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Honeywell Sav. & Ownership Plan v. Jicha, 2010 WL 276237 (D.
N.J. 2010); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F.Supp.2d 610, 614-15 (M.D. N.C. 2005).
See also the pre-Egelhoff slayer decision in Addison v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 5
F.Supp.2d 392, 393-94 (W.D. Va. 1998). These cases apply the applicable state slayer
statute or federal common law based on the state slayer statute.
The slayer cases are different from the divorce cases in that the murdered victim did not
have an opportunity to revoke, whereas the divorced spouse did. This is why the divorcerevocation rule is in the form of a rebuttable presumption but the slayer rule is not rebuttable.
The slayer rule is also based on the principle that a slayer cannot be allowed to profit from
his or her own wrong, whereas divorce is not a wrong. Finally, the slayer rule is universally
applied to nonprobate transfers. Courts in jurisdictions in which the slayer statute only
applies to probate transfers supplement the statute by the common-law slayer rule to cover
nonprobate transfers. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 8.4 cmt. i (2003) (“If
a statute covers some but not all of the situations in which a killer stands to benefit from the
wrong as provided in this section, the slayer rule as enunciated in this section applies to the
situations not covered by the statute.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 45 cmt. b (2011) (“If a case is not covered by a particular statute, it must not
be supposed that the enrichment of the slayer is therefore to be allowed.”); Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 803, 847 (1993) (“[I]n
jurisdictions where the slayer statute refer[s] only to inheritance by will or intestacy, courts
nonetheless [apply] a common law slayer rule [to nonprobate transfers].”)
25
The Supreme Court in Hillman said that the case was “govern[ed]” by two prior
decisions, Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (5-to-3 decision), and Wissner v.
Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (5-to-3 decision). The dissenting opinions in both cases were
well reasoned. Justices Minton, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented in Wissner, saying that
23
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effecting divorce-revocation rule for federally authorized or regulated
nonprobate payments.26 Sadly, the Court seemed unaware of the decadeslong movement toward unifying the law of probate and nonprobate
transfers, of which the divorce-revocation and post-distribution rules are
parts.27 If the justices were aware of that movement, they were decidedly
unmoved by it.

II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE ELECTIVE-SHARE LAWS
Anglo-American law has traditionally protected the decedent’s
surviving spouse from disinheritance. In early law, protection took the form
of dower and curtesy. Protection now takes the form of a statutory elective
share. The elective share is ineffective if it only applies to the decedent’s
net probate estate, just as the federal estate tax would be ineffective if it
only taxed the value of the decedent’s net probate estate.28 Expanding upon
statutes in New York and Pennsylvania,29 the 1969 UPC developed the
concept of the augmented estate. Under the Code, the surviving spouse’s
elective share is applied to the decedent’s net probate estate augmented by

“the right which Congress gave the serviceman to designate his beneficiary does not require
disrespect of settled family law and the incidents of family relationship.” Justice Stevens,
dissenting in Ridgway, said that “[c]laims based on family obligation . . . may be precisely
the type of claim for which the federal benefit was intended.” Justice Powell, joined by
Justice Rehnquist, dissented on similar grounds. The dissenters in both cases argued that the
only purpose of Congress in stating that the insured had the right to name the beneficiary
was to protect the interest of the beneficiary from the claims of creditors. The Court in
Hillman could easily have adopted the analysis of the dissenters in Ridgway and Wissner and
held that Hillman was not governed by those cases.
26
Yet, as Professor Langbein notes (supra note 6, prepublication draft at 17 n.63), the
Supreme Court has held that the constructive-trust remedy is authorized under ERISA’s
enforcement provision authorizing “appropriate equitable relief.” ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). In Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., 547 U.S. 356
(2006), an ERISA-regulated health insurance plan paid medical expenses on behalf of the
Sereboffs, who were insured plan participants. The plan contained a subrogation clause
entitling the insurer to reimbursement for such payments in the event of a subsequent tort
recovery. The Court sustained the insurer’s right to “a constructive trust or equitable lien,”
which the Court called a “‘familiar rul[e] of equity.’” Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
27
Sadly, too, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief supporting preemption in
Hillman. He also seemed unaware of the movement toward unifying the law of probate and
nonprobate transfers and questioned the policy of the divorce-revocation statute. The
Solicitor General argued that a “divorced federal employee might want his ex-spouse to
receive insurance proceeds for a number of reasons—out of a sense of obligation, remorse,
or continuing affection, or to help care for children of the marriage that remain in the exspouse’s custody.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
28, Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1943 (2013) (emphasis added). The
preempted divorce-revocation rule is in the form of a rebuttable presumption that the
divorced spouse would not want the ex-spouse to benefit, but the rule espoused by the
Solicitor General and adopted by the Court in effect creates the opposite presumption.
28
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV.
21, 56 (1994).
29
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2203.
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the death-time value of specified will substitute transfers, including “any
transfer during the marriage whereby property is held at the time of
decedent’s death by decedent and another with right of survivorship.”30 The
1990 revisions to the UPC’s elective share expand the augmented estate to
include the value of “the decedent’s ownership interest in property or
accounts held in POD, TOD, or co-ownership registration with the right of
survivorship.”31 About thirty-seven percent of the non-community property
states—mainly those that have adopted the UPC reforms—extend their
elective-share laws to nonprobate transfers.32 The ALI’s Restatement of
Property promulgates UPC-type anti-evasion rules as common-law rules.33
By extension, Egelhoff and Hillman probably mean that state electiveshare anti-evasion law as well as divorce-revocation law are preempted by
ERISA and other federal statutes authorizing or regulating nonprobate
transfers.34 ERISA itself, as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984
(REAct),35 protects the rights of a surviving spouse in an employee
spouse’s ERISA-covered pension plan.36 But REAct does not apply to
FEGLIA, the federal life insurance act at issue in Hillman, nor does it apply
to other federally authorized or regulated life insurance acts, including
those involved in Wissner v. Wissner37 (National Service Life Insurance Act
of 1940) and Ridgway v. Ridgway38 (Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance
Act of 1965), cases that the Supreme Court needlessly found controlling in
Hillman.39 So, except for ERISA-covered plans, a decedent’s surviving
spouse has no protection with respect to federal statutes authorizing or
regulating nonprobate transfers.
But federal law provides another means of dodging state anti-evasion
rules. Unlike nonprobate arrangements available only to specific sub-sets
of the general public, such as federal government employees or employees
whose pension plans are covered by ERISA, this one is available to the

30

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1)(iii) (1969).
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(1)(C).
32
Elective-share laws extend to nonprobate transfers in Alaska, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia.
33
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 9.1 cmt. i (2003).
34
See Gallanis, supra note 6, at 190-91.
35
Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
36
With respect to marriages ending at death, REAct creates spousal interests in the
form of survivorship rights. If the employee spouse survives to retirement age, the pension
must be paid as a “qualified joint and survivor annuity” (QJSA). If the employee spouse dies
before retirement age and his or her pension is vested, the surviving spouse is entitled to a
“qualified preretirement survivor annuity” (QPSA). These two types of REAct annuities are
discussed in JOHN H. LANGBEIN, DAVID A. PRATT & SUSAN J. STABILE, PENSION AND
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 285-86 (5th ed. 2010).
37
338 U.S. 655 (1950).
38
454 U.S. 46 (1981).
39
See supra note 25.
31
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public at large: Purchase U.S. government securities in survivorship form.
The Constitution grants to Congress the power “to borrow Money on the
credit of the United States.”40 Congress has delegated that power to the
Secretary of the Treasury.41 The Secretary has issued regulations that
provide that the survivor of any U.S. government security registered in
survivorship form is the sole and absolute owner.42 The purpose of granting
sole and absolute ownership is “to give investors the assurance that the
forms of registration they select will establish conclusively the right to their
. . . securities. . . . It will have the effect of overriding inconsistent State
laws.”43 The Supreme Court in Free v. Bland44 agreed, holding that any
contrary state law is preempted. The contrary state law in Free was the
Texas community property law, but a New York court45 has held that the
same rule overrides the elective share of the surviving spouse as well. Had
these state laws not been preempted, federally authorized or regulated
nonprobate transfers would only be subject to the surviving spouse’s
elective share in states whose elective-share law reaches nonprobate
transfers.46
Preemption does not necessarily reduce the amount that the surviving
spouse takes. The value of any U.S. government security in survivorship
form can still be included in the UPC’s augmented estate. Preemption
simply means that the survivor takes the security. Other takers of amounts
included in the augmented estate must contribute more to make up the
deficiency.47 The problem arises, however, if those amounts are insufficient
to make up the deficiency or if there are no other takers. In such cases,
federal preemption does reduce or even eliminate the surviving spouse’s
share.
The means of evading the elective share is therefore apparent: Spouses
who want to disinherit their surviving spouses need only convert as much
of their liquid wealth as possible to U.S. government securities in
survivorship form with third-party donees, so that as little as possible
remains for their surviving spouses. The UPC has a post-distribution rule
similar to the Virginia rule at issue in Hillman.48 In the light of Hillman, the
UPC post-distribution rule would also be preempted. Because the Treasury

40

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 3102-3106.
42
31 C.F.R. §§ 315.20, 315.70, 357.21.
43
31 C.F.R. § 357 App. A to Part 357.
44
369 U.S. 663 (1962).
45
Matter of Scheiner 535 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sur. Ct. 1988).
46
For a list of those states, see supra note 32.
47
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-209. The same point applies to life insurance or
pension benefits under other federally authorized or regulated nonprobate transfers, such as
ERISA or FEGLIA, but those nonprobate transfers are only available to subsets of the
general population.
48
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-210(b).
41
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Department has decided that the survivor of any U.S. government security
registered in survivorship form is the sole and absolute owner
notwithstanding “any inconsistent State laws,”49 it is hard to believe that the
Court would allow federal common law to change that result.
The conclusion is inescapable: Despite the best efforts of the ULC and
the ALI to prevent evasion of the surviving spouse’s elective share, federal
law has made evasion possible by those determined to disinherit their
spouses.50

III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS REGARDING INITIAL
VALIDITY OF BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS
Although the Supreme Court in Hillman said that the FEGLIA life
insurance proceeds “belong to the named beneficiary and no other,”51 and
although Treasury regulations provide that the survivor of any U.S.
government security registered in survivorship form is the “sole and
absolute owner,”52 those propositions surely cannot stand if the beneficiary
designation would have been initially invalid due to incapacity, undue
influence, or defective execution.53
No case has reached the Supreme Court on issues of initial validity, but
the Supreme Court has held that ERISA gaps concerning contract and tort
law must be filled, not by the law of an individual state, but by federal

49

31 C.F.R. § 357 App. A to Part 357. These regulations are issued by the Bureau of
the Public Debt, a division of the Treasury Department. On February 23, 1996 and on
October 2, 1996, I wrote on behalf of the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate
Code (later named the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts) to the head
of the Bureau asking for reconsideration of the preemption of state elective-share law on the
grounds that those regulations were written when state elective-share law only applied to
wills and did not apply to nonprobate transfers, and so elective-share law could not have
been the federal government’s original concern. No one from the federal agency responded
to either letter. For details, see LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MARY
LOUISE FELLOWS & THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 620 (3d ed. 2002).
50
On May 20, 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of executive
departments and agencies stating that “the general policy of my Administration [is] that
preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only
with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal
basis for preemption.” Presidential Memorandum, Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (2009).
To a similar effect, see Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (2009), and Exec.
Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987). These presidential orders have not led the
Treasury Department to reconsider its regulations regarding U.S. Government securities held
in survivorship form.
51
See supra text accompanying note 18.
52
See supra text accompanying note 42.
53
Cf. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Eglehoff, supra note 23. See also Leon E. Irish &
Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 109, 111 (1985) (“Congress enacted ERISA while still oblivious to
numerous problems related to benefit plans that the states had already recognized and
addressed.”).
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common law.54 Although divorce-revocation and elective-share law is
preempted and not replaced by federal common law, a different pattern has
emerged from the decisions of the lower federal courts in both pre- and
post-Egelhoff cases on questions of initial validity of the beneficiary
designation: Federal common law replaces preempted state law on these
questions. The problem is that there is no preexisting body of federal
common law that deals with these questions. As a result, the federal courts
are forced to create their own federal common law.55
In an early ERISA breach-of-contract case, Singer v. Black & Decker
Corporation,56 the Fourth Circuit stated this guiding principle:
In fashioning federal common law, courts do not look to the law of a
particular state, but rather should apply common-law doctrines best suited
to furthering the goals of ERISA. Consequently, federal common law
should be consistent across the circuits.57

We shall see that the Fourth Circuit’s guiding principle has not been
uniformly followed in wealth-transfer cases and hence that federal common
law in those cases is not consistent across the circuits. Although the lower
federal courts consistently hold that state law is preempted and replaced by
federal common law, they are not always consistent or rigorous in stating
the sources on which they base federal common law.
A. Lack of Mental Capacity
In a pre-Egelhoff case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hall,58 the
federal district court for Maryland applied the following federal commonlaw standard of mental capacity:
To be capable of effecting a valid change of beneficiary a person should
have clearness of mind and memory sufficient to know the nature of the
property for which he is about to name a beneficiary, the nature of the act
which he is about to perform, the names and identities of those who are the
natural objects of his bounty; his relationship towards them, and the
consequences of his act, uninfluenced by any material delusions.

54
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). See also Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-112 (1989) (holding that an employer’s fiduciary
duties under ERISA are to be controlled by federal common law).
55
See Thomason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1993) (where ERISA
is silent, court must develop federal common law and, in so doing, may use state common
law as a basis, to the extent that state law is not inconsistent with congressional policy
concerns).
56
964 F.2d 1449 (4th Cir. 1992).
57
Singer, 964 F.2d at 1453.
58
9 F.Supp.2d 560 (D. Md. 1998).
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B. Undue Influence
In Tinsley v. General Motors Corporation,59 a pre-Egelhoff case, a
change of beneficiary form in an ERISA-covered life insurance policy was
challenged on the ground that it was procured by undue influence. The
General Motors employee died domiciled in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit
held that the Michigan case law of undue influence was preempted and that
the case was controlled by federal common law.
C. Substantial Compliance for Defective Execution
Employees often fill out beneficiary designation forms or change of
beneficiary forms without the benefit of counsel.60 The forms can also be
confusing and can lead to defective execution of the correct form or correct
execution of the wrong form.61
Although the Fourth Circuit in Singer said that in fashioning federal
common law the “courts do not look to the law of a particular state,” the
same circuit, in a later case, Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams,62
said that “federal courts may draw on state common law in shaping the
applicable body of federal common law.”63 The court in Phoenix endorsed
the following statement of federal common law of substantial compliance:
[A]n insured substantially complies with the change of beneficiary
provisions of an ERISA life insurance policy when the insured: (1)
evidences his or her intent to make the change and (2) attempts to
effectuate the change by undertaking positive action which is for all
practical purposes similar to the action required by the change of
beneficiary provisions of the policy.64

Although Phoenix was a pre-Egelhoff case,65 the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits have applied the Phoenix test in post-Egelhoff cases.66 Applying
59

227 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2000).
See Sterk & Leslie, supra note 11, at ___.
61
Id. at ___.
62
30 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994).
63
Phoenix. 30 F.3d 554 at 564.
64
Id.
65
In other pre-Egelhoff cases, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits followed the Phoenix test
(Estate of Altobelli v. International Bus. Machines Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1996);
Hill v. AT&T Corp., 125 F.3d 646, 648 (8th Cir. 1997)), but the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
held that the state substantial compliance doctrine was not preempted (BankAmerica Pension
Plan v. McMath, 206 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2000); Peckham v. Gem State Mutual of Utah,
964 F.2d 1043, 1052-54 (10th Cir. 1992)).
66
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2002); Guardian
Life Ins. Co. v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 240-41 (5th Cir. 2004). Accord Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Schmid, 337 F.Supp.2d 325 (D. Mass. 2004). Although the employee in the Schmid case
telephoned his employer’s customer service representatives saying that he wanted to change
the beneficiary on an insurance policy from his daughter to his second wife, he did not
substantially comply with the change-of-beneficiary requirements. Because of a transmission
60
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the Phoenix test, the Seventh Circuit found that an unsigned change-ofbeneficiary form was valid on the ground that the failure to sign was a
“careless error.”67

IV. THE ROLES OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to confirm the use of
federal common law on questions of initial validity, but it is difficult to
imagine that the Court would reject the application of such law in cases of
mental incapacity or undue influence. Invalidity due to mental incapacity
or undue influence is universal law. It is hoped that the Court would also
confirm the use of federal common law of substantial compliance in cases
of defective execution. Nearly all states follow such a doctrine for defective
execution of life insurance beneficiary designations.68 Because the Court
has not spoken on issues of initial validity, it is even possible that the Court
would hold that state laws on these questions are not preempted in the first
place, on the ground that state laws on mental capacity and undue
influence, and perhaps substantial compliance as well, do not conflict with
Congress’ scheme in enacting ERISA, FEGLIA, and similar federal
statutes.69
Assuming that the Supreme Court would approve of federal common
law replacing preempted state law on questions of initial validity, what are
appropriate sources of federal common law?
The Fourth Circuit’s guiding principle in the Singer case is that
“federal common law should be consistent across the circuits.”70 In
practice, however, the lower federal courts’ efforts to develop federal
common law have been inconsistent. The substantial-compliance test in
Phoenix was fashioned by the lower district court,71 which based the
formulation on two sources: a federal district court decision from the
Eastern District of Missouri72 and a treatise on insurance.73 The federal
district court in Missouri fashioned the formulation from Missouri case

error by the customer service representative, he did not complete a change of beneficiary
form before he died. The Sixth Circuit is alone in refusing to recognize a federal commonlaw doctrine of substantial compliance. See Kmatz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Fed.
Appx. 451 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion); Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Craig,
157 Fed. Appx. 787 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion).
67
Davis v. Combes, 294 F.3d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 2002).
68
See COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 83.15 (1995); Meredith H. Bogart, Note, State
Doctrines of Substantial Compliance: A Call for ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal
Common Law Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 447, 469-73 (2003).
69
See supra note 19. Cf. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Egelhoff, supra note 23.
70
Singer, 964 F.2d 1449.
71
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 828 F.Supp. 379, 388 (D. S.C. 1993).
72
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 770 F.Supp. 1393 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
73
19 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 82.76 at 871 (2d ed. 1984).
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law.74 The Maryland federal district court in Hall derived the mental
incapacity standard from Taylor v. United States,75 a decision of the federal
district court for the Western District of Arkansas. The Arkansas federal
district court based that standard on a decision of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas and two legal encyclopedias, Corpus Juris Secundum and
American Jurisprudence. The Sixth Circuit in Tinsley stated that “we look
to state-law principles for guidance.”76 The court then extracted federal
common law of undue influence for the Sixth Circuit from cases from
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and from American
Jurisprudence.77 The case law shows that the sources of federal common
law have been variously based on case law from Arkansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee and an insurance treatise and two
legal encyclopedias.
The only consistency in the development of federal common law is that
the lower federal courts have overlooked the most accessible, unifying, and
reliable sources for determining federal common law: the ALI Restatements
and the ULC’s uniform laws.78
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch,79 the Court did note
that ERISA “abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.”80
Although ERISA itself did not direct the source of trust law, the Court
referred generously to the Restatement of Trusts in developing federal
common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.81 In
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,82 the Third Circuit referred to the
Restatement of Torts in developing federal common law of joint and
several liability.
Restatements may be a more appropriate source for federal common
law for a reason apart from their use in Firestone Tire & Rubber and Alcan

74

Metropolitan Life, 770 F.Supp. 1393, 1397.
113 F.Supp. 143, 148 (W.D. Ark. 1953), aff’d, 211 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1954).
76
Tinsley, 227 F.3d at 704.
77
Id. at 705.
78
On mental incapacity, see PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 8.1. On undue
influence and fraud, see id § 8.3. Although the Uniform Probate Code does not address
substantial compliance for insurance beneficiary designations, the Restatement provides that
the harmless-error rule for execution of wills (see id. § 3.3) applies to the creation,
revocation, or amendment of will substitutes, including the designation or change of
beneficiary (see id. § 7.2 cmt. d).
Scholars have long argued that federal common law should be derived from the
Restatements or uniform laws to achieve uniformity. See Gallanis, supra note 6; David S.
Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal Common Law for ERISA-Preempted
Beneficiary Designations, 28 J. PENSION PLANNING & COMPLIANCE 29 (Fall 2002).
79
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
80
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111.
81
Id. at 111-112. The Court also referred to the standard treatises on trust law by
Austin Wakeman Scott and George G. Bogert.
82
964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992).
75
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Aluminum. The purpose of Restatements is to unify state common-law
principles, whereas uniform laws achieve uniformity only by state
legislative enactment.83
Although federal common law, preferably derived from Restatements,
is an acceptable alternative to non-preemption in cases of initial validity,
federal common law is problematic in some cases if, as the Fourth Circuit
stated in Singer, federal common law “should be consistent across the
circuits.” The problem arises when state wealth-transfer law is itself not
uniform, especially when the lack of uniformity relates to the fundamental
question of whether the state law extends to nonprobate transfers.
As noted earlier, divorce-revocation laws extend to nonprobate
transfers in about thirty percent of the states and elective-share laws extend
to nonprobate transfers in about thirty-seven percent of the non-community
property states.84 Although the ALI now bases Restatement provisions on
a minority view if that view is considered the better view,85 it is probably
unrealistic to expect federal courts to adopt minority positions as federal
common law for all states even when supported by a Restatement. In such
cases, holding that state law is not preempted has the advantage of
uniformity, not across state lines, but within each state regarding
nonprobate transfers that are and those that are not authorized or regulated
by federal law. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Eglehoff and Hillman
opted for preemption—period. The unhappy result is that former spouses
can benefit but surviving spouses can be disinherited.

V. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE WILL-EXECUTION
FORMALITIES FOR MILITARY WILLS
Not all federal preemption of state wealth-transfer law is harmful.
A case in point is a federal statute that expressly preempts state willexecution formalities for military wills.
Historically, soldiers in active military service and mariners or
sailors at sea were excused from the more rigorous testamentary

83

Although uniform laws are not enacted in all states, there is state-law precedent for
looking to a uniform law for guidance even in states that have not enacted the law. See, e.g.,
Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166, 177 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 916 A.2d
1 (Conn. 2007); Allen v. Dalk, 826 So.2d 245, 250 (Fla. 2002); In re Will of Ranney, 589
A.2d 1339, 1343 (N.J. 1991).
84
See supra notes 11 and 32.
85
The Institute’s mission is “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law
and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and
to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.” See ALI Overview, available
at http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview. The Restatement provides that
the divorce-revocation and elective-share laws extend to nonprobate transfers and present
them as common-law rules. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 4.1 cmt. p.
(divorce revocation); § 9.1 cmt. i (elective share).
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formalities,86 and comparable measures still exist in some probate
codes.87 The UPC contains no such dispensation.
Most states, including the UPC, have a choice-of-law provision,
recognizing the validity of a will executed in compliance with the law
at the time of execution of the place where the will is executed.88
Because military personnel are based throughout the country and in
many foreign countries,89 state choice-of-law provisions might not be
sufficient to validate all wills executed by military personnel. So, in
2000, Congress enacted a federal will-execution statute for members
of the armed forces and their dependents. The statute was buried in
the broader National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000
(NDAA).90 In the NDAA, military wills are called “military
testamentary instruments.”
To assure that state probate courts accept military wills as validly
executed, the NDAA provides that “[a] military testamentary
instrument is exempt from any requirement of form, formality, or
recording before probate that is provided for testamentary instruments
under the laws of a State and has the same legal effect as a
testamentary instrument prepared and executed in accordance with
the laws of the State in which it is presented for probate.”
The NDAA constitutes a mini federal probate code limited to will
execution. The federal statute provides that a military testamentary
instrument must (1) be executed by a “person eligible for military
legal assistance,”91 (2) be executed in accordance with prescribed

86

See Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3, §§ 19-21, 23; Wills Act, 1837, 7 Wm.
4 & 1 Vict., ch. 26, § 11.
87
See Nowell D. Bamberger, Are Military Testamentary Instruments
Unconstitutional—Why Compliance with State Testamentary Formality Requirements
Remains Essential, 196 MIL. L. REV. 91, 124-25 (2008).
88
Section 2-506 of the UPC provides that a “written will is valid if . . . its execution
complies with the law at the time of execution of the place where the will is executed, or, of
the law of the place where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator is
domiciled, has a place of abode, or is a national.”
89
See List of United States Military Bases, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_
of_United_States_military_bases.
90
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 § 551(a),
10 U.S.C. § 1044d, titled “Military testamentary instruments: requirement for recognition
by States.” For Department of Defense regulations regarding military testamentary
instruments, see http://regulations.vlex.com/vid/testamentary-instruments-attorney- advance22952048.
91
A “person eligible for military legal assistance” is a member of the armed forces who
is on active duty; a member or former member entitled to retired or retainer pay or equivalent
pay; an officer of the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service who is on active duty
or entitled to retired or equivalent pay; and a dependent of such a person.
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formalities, and (3) make a disposition of the property of the
testator.92 To be valid as a military testamentary instrument, the will
must also be executed by the testator in the presence of a military
legal assistance counsel93 acting as presiding attorney and at least two
disinterested witnesses, each of whom attests to witnessing the
testator’s execution of the instrument by signing it.94 The statute also
authorizes the use of a self-proving affidavit.95 Although the federal
statute does not say so expressly, a properly executed military will
should continue to be treated as a validly executed military will even
after the military member is discharged or retires.
Military personnel are executing these federal wills. The
Department of Defense directs all commanding officers to “urge
military personnel to seek legal counsel regarding an estate plan well
before mobilization, deployment, or similar activities.”96 Enclosure
E1 of the DoD Directive provides the preamble for military
testamentary instruments that the statute requires:
This is a MILITARY TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENT prepared
pursuant to section 1044d of title 10, United States Code, and executed by
a person authorized to receive legal assistance from the Military Services.
Federal law exempts this document from any requirement of form,
formality, or recording that is provided for testamentary instruments under
the laws of a State, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth.
Territory, or possession of the United States. Federal law specifies that
this document shall receive the same legal effect as a testamentary
instrument prepared and executed in accordance with the laws of the State
in which it is presented for probate.97

The federal execution formalities satisfy the requirements of most but

92

Under the UPC, a will need not dispose of property, but can act solely as a
revocation of a prior will, nominate a guardian, appoint an executor, or disinherit an heir.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(57).
93
The term “military legal assistance counsel” is defined as (A) a judge advocate (as
defined in 10 U.S.C. § 801(13)), i.e., an officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of
the Army or the Navy, an officer of the Air Force or the Marine Corps who is designated as
a judge advocate, or a commissioned officer of the Coast Guard designated for special duty
(law)); or (B) a civilian attorney serving as a legal assistance officer under 10 U.S.C. § 1044,
i.e., a civilian attorney who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court
of a State.
94
10 U.S.C. § 1044d(c).
95
Id. § 1044d(d).
96
Department of Defense Directive No. 1350.4 at ¶ 4.1.3 (April 28, 2001), 32 C.F.R
§ 153.4, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/135004p.pdf.
97
Id. at 5.
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not all states.98 Perhaps because compliance with the federal formalities for
executing a military will satisfies the will-execution formalities of most
states, there has been no litigation over the validity of a particular military
will99 or over the constitutionality of the federal statute preempting state
will-execution law.100
The federal statute authorizing military wills only deals with will
execution. The statute does not provide that the beneficiaries of military
wills are entitled to take their bequests and devises. The only federal
preemption question is whether the execution of the wills complies with
statutory formalities. Such state-law doctrines as revocation by act or
subsequent will, divorce-revocation, elective share of the decedent’s
surviving spouse, antilapse, lack of mental capacity,101 undue influence, the

98
Compliance with the federal formalities satisfies the formalities of the UPC (see
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502), but does not satisfy the formalities of all states. Under
Louisiana law, the testator must sign the will in the presence of two witnesses and a notary
and must sign at the end and each page (LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1577), but the federal
statute has no such requirements. Under some state statutes, the witnesses must sign in the
presence of each other (see, e.g.,TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-104), but the federal statute has
no such requirement. Under some state statutes, the testator must declare to the witnesses
that the document is his or her will (see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103; N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.1), but the federal statute has no such explicit requirement.
Under some state statutes, the testator must sign the will “at the end” (see, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28-25-103), but the federal statute has no such requirement. Also, as noted supra
note 92, a will under the Uniform Probate Code and other state statutes need not dispose of
property, but can act solely as a revocation of a prior will, nominate a guardian, appoint an
executor, or disinherit an heir (see, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(57)), but the federal
statute requires the will to dispose of property in order to qualify as a military testamentary
instrument.
99
The only decision found is Auclair v. Auclair, C.A. No. PC 2012-3714 (R.I. Super.
Ct., Sept. 18, 2013), but that case decided that Rhode Island was the decedent’s state of
domicile at death. Whether the decedent’s military testamentary instrument was validly
executed was not an issue in the case.
100
The constitutionality of the federal statute has not been tested. One commentator has
argued that the statute is unconstitutional. See Bamberger, supra note 87, at 108-110. Under
the 10th amendment, “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States . . . .” To be constitutional, federal
preemption of state will-execution formalities for military wills must come under one of the
enumerated powers granted to Congress. Despite the argument by one commentator to the
contrary, the federal military-will statute is almost certainly constitutional under the war
powers granted to Congress by article I, § 8. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649
(1961) (Upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute requiring the personal property
of veterans who die in a veterans’ hospital without a will or heirs to pass to the United States
rather than escheat to the state, the Court said: “The fact that [the federal law] pertains to the
devolution of property does not render it invalid. Although it is true that this is an area
normally left to the States, it is not immune under the Tenth Amendment from laws passed
by the Federal Government which are, as is the law here, necessary and proper to the
exercise of a delegated power.”). See also Gerry W. Beyer, Introduction to Military Wills 1,
4-5, available at http://www.professorbeyer.com/Articles/Military_Wills.html.
101
State statutes require the testator to be “of sound mind” and of a certain age
(typically 18) in order to execute a valid will (see, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501), but
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slayer rule, probate procedures, and any other state-law wealth-transfer
doctrine should be just as applicable to military wills as they are to
nonmilitary wills.
Universal acceptance of military wills is a worthy goal,102 but federal
preemption of state-law execution requirements is not foolproof. A few
states have put the matter at rest by providing that a will executed in
accordance with the federal statute is deemed to be validly executed under
state law. A Vermont statute, for example, provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a military will containing a
provision stating that the will is prepared pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1044d
shall be deemed to be legally executed and shall be of the same force and
effect as if executed in the mode prescribed by the laws of this state.103

VI. PROMOTING PERPETUAL TRUSTS104
For centuries, Anglo-American law has curtailed excessive dead-hand
control through the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities (the commonlaw Rule). Judicial concern about excessive dead-hand control appeared as
early as the seventeenth century when Lord Nottingham, in the Duke of
Norfolk’s Case,105 upheld the trust at issue but suggested that there was a
limit “when any inconvenience appears . . . .” The courts thereafter
developed the common-law Rule case by case over a long period of time.
As developed by the courts, and as crystallized in the late nineteenth
century by Harvard Law School Professor John Chipman Gray, the
common-law Rule came to be stated as follows: “No [contingent future]
interest [in real or personal property] is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest.”106
As a mechanism for curtailing excessive dead-hand control, the
common-law Rule was poorly designed. One flaw was that it invalidated
a contingent future interest on the basis of what might happen in the future,
not on the basis of what actually happened in the future. In the late
twentieth century, reform efforts to correct this flaw started taking hold. In
1986, the ULC promulgated the Uniform Statutory Rule Against
Perpetuities (USRAP), which provided that a contingent future interest that

the federal statute has no such requirements. A few state statutes waive the age requirement
for wills of members of the armed forces. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 57.
102
Full disclosure: I served as a member of the armed forces from 1966 to 1968.
103
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 7. Florida has enacted a similar statute. See FLA. STAT .
ANN. § 732.502.
104
For greater detail, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Promotes Perpetual
Trusts: Why? (Univ. of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 349,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326524.
105
3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
106
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (2d ed. 1906).
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would be valid under the common-law Rule remains valid at the outset, but
a contingent future interest that would be invalid under the common-law
Rule is only invalid if it does not actually vest or fail to vest within ninety
years.107 USRAP was incorporated into the UPC108 and came to be enacted
in over half of the states.
USRAP was on its way to even wider enactment when Congress
intervened, with the effect of stalling and then reversing its progress.
Congress’s intervention has also prevented the additional perpetuity
reforms promulgated by the ALI from taking hold: In place of a lives-inbeing-plus-twenty-one-years limit, the Restatement (Third) of Property
adopts a two-younger-generations limit and requires a trust to terminate and
its principal distributed outright if the trust exceeds that limit.109
Congress’s intervention occurred in 1986 when it enacted the current
incarnation of the federal generation-skipping transfer tax (GST tax).110 The
GST tax imposes a flat tax at the highest federal estate tax rate (forty
percent as of 2013) on generation-skipping transfers.111 The purpose of the
GST tax is to make sure that property is taxed every time it shifts from
generation to generation or skips a generation.
As part of the GST tax, Congress exempted trusts up to a certain value.
The ceiling on the GST exemption started out at $1 million, but it is now
$5.25 million (double that for a married couple). The GST exemption,112
not the GST tax itself, sparked a perpetual-trust movement. When Congress
granted the exemption, it failed to impose a durational limit on exempt
trusts. Congress relied on state perpetuity laws to supply that limit. In
hindsight, the reliance on state perpetuity laws was badly misplaced. At the
instigation of state banking groups and estate-planning attorneys, states
began to pass legislation allowing settlors to create perpetual trusts—trusts
that can last for several centuries or even forever.113
Because Congress has not acted to close the tax loophole, the
perpetual-trust movement is in full bloom. With state perpetuity laws out
of the way, the wealthy created and continue to create perpetual trusts in
significant numbers. An empirical study found that roughly $100 billion in
trust assets had flowed into states allowing perpetual trusts.114 The study

107

See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a) (1986).
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901 to -906.
109
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §§ 27.1 to 27.3 (2011).
110
I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663.
111
See id. §§ 2641, 2001.
112
I.R.C. § 2631.
113
See Ira Mark Bloom, How Federal Transfer Taxes Affect the Development of
Property Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 673 (2000) (“The very recent perpetuities repeal
movement is the best example of how federal transfer tax laws affect the development of
property law in the worst of ways.”). See also Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing
The Rule Against Perpetuities, TAX NOTES 569 (April 24, 2000).
114
See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
108
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was based on data through 2003 from the annual reports that institutional
trustees file with federal banking authorities. Considerably more wealth has
undoubtedly moved into these states in the years following 2003.115
Not only is there is no federal interest in promoting perpetually GSTexempt trusts, the federal interest cuts the other way. Tax revenues will be
lost by Congress’s action and subsequent inaction. The longer Congress
procrastinates, the amount of wealth safely sheltered in perpetually GSTexempt trusts will continue to grow.

VII. SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVOR BENEFITS FOR
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
The previous topics dealt with federal preemption of state law
regarding transfers of assets belonging to the transferor. This topic is a
change of direction. Federal law in this instance has embraced state wealthtransfer law, not preempted it. The topic is the right of children of assisted
reproduction (ART children) to Social Security survivor benefits. Congress
has chosen to make the right to these federal benefits depend on state
intestacy law. Although this is a case in which uniformity is desirable, state
intestacy law is far from uniform and is silent regarding the intestacy rights
of ART children in many states.116
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1939 to provide a
monthly benefit for children of a deceased insured wage earner. Section
202(d)(1)117 provides that every “child” of a deceased wage earner is

Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410 (2005).
The study found that the states that attracted the most perpetual-trust business were those
that do not tax trust income produced by funds originating from out of state. See id. States
that levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state experienced no observable
increase in trust business. See id. at 420. The $100 billion trust figure did not represent the
value of GST-exempt perpetual trusts. It appears that the payoff for institutional trustees
operating in these perpetual-trust states is that “high net worth clients” create perpetual trusts
up to the GST exemption limit and also move the greater bulk of their wealth into nonexempt trusts with the same institutional trustee.
115
I have previously questioned whether the state legislators who vote to authorize
perpetual trusts and the wealthy who create them have thought through what they are
allowing or putting in place, in view of the fact that these trusts can have as many as 450
living beneficiaries 150 years after creation, more than 7,000 living beneficiaries after 250
years, and more than 114,000 living beneficiaries after 350 years. After 175 years, the
settlor’s genetic relationship to all his then-living beneficiaries will drop below 1 percent,
and as the trust presses on into the more distant future, the settlor’s genetic relationship to
the beneficiaries will decline further as the trust benefits ever more remote relatives. See
Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts (Univ. of
Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 259, 2011, updated Jan. 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975117.
116
Another area of nonuniformity is the right of adopted children to inherit from their
genetic parents. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119. Adopted children commonly inherit from
their adopting parents. See id. § 2-118.
117
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

21

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 92 [2013]

The Creeping Federalization of Wealth-Transfer Law

22

entitled to a monthly benefit if the child was dependent upon the wage
earner at the time of death.
In determining whether an applicant is the child of a deceased wage
earner, section 216(h)(2)(A)118 provides that the Commissioner of Social
Security “shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the
devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which
such individual is domiciled . . . . at the time of his death.” Regulations
issued under the auspices of the Commissioner of Social Security define the
word “child” as one who would inherit under the intestate succession law
of the state of domicile of the deceased wage earner.119
In 1939, intestacy rights of children were nearly uniform,120 but have
now become mixed on the question of intestacy rights of posthumously
conceived ART children. In Astrue v. Capato,121 the Supreme Court had to
decide whether Social Security survivor benefits for posthumously
conceived ART children must still depend on disparate state intestacy laws.
Robert Capato, who was married to Karen Capato, developed cancer.
Before undergoing chemotherapy, he deposited semen in a sperm bank,
where it was frozen and stored. Robert died a couple of years later. Shortly
after his death, Karen began in vitro fertilization with his frozen sperm, and
eighteen months after his death, gave birth to twins. Karen claimed Social
Security survivor benefits on behalf of the twins.
To resolve a split in the circuits,122 the case reached the Supreme Court.
Justice Ginsberg delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that
“the [Social Security Administration’s] reading [that defines the word
“child” as a child who would inherit by intestacy123] is better attuned to the
statute’s text and its design to benefit primarily those supported by the
deceased wage earner in his or her lifetime. And even if the SSA’s
longstanding interpretation is not the only reasonable one, it is at least a
permissible construction that garners the Court’s respect under [the
Chevron doctrine].”124

118

42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A).
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.355.
120
Back then, nonmarital children inherited from their mothers but not from their
fathers unless certain conditions were met. In the wake of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977), and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). nonmarital children now inherit from their
mothers and fathers. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-117.
121
566 U.S. ___ , 132 S.Ct. 2021 (2012)
122
Circuit court cases holding that survivor benefits do not depend on state intestacy
law are Capato v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2013), and Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Circuit court cases holding the opposite are Beelr v.
Astrue, 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), and Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011).
123
See supra text accompanying note 119.
124
Astrue, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2026, citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The requirement that an applicant
satisfy the definition of “child” is not the only statutory requirement. The Act also requires
119
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The Court was well aware that posthumous conception of ART
children is such a new development that state intestacy laws regarding the
intestacy rights of those children have only sporadically caught up to the
phenomenon. The Court was also aware that the UPC now addresses the
matter.125 Had Robert Capato died domiciled in a state that had enacted the
UPC, his posthumously conceived children would have inherited,126 and
that would have entitled them to Social Security benefits. Unfortunately, he
died domiciled in Florida, where in order to inherit the twins would had to
have been conceived before his death.127 The Court also foreclosed the idea
of providing uniformity among the states by developing federal common
law on the question: “We cannot [create] a uniform federal rule the
statute’s text scarcely supports.”128
The result is that the posthumously conceived ART children of one
wage earner can qualify for survivor benefits but the posthumously
conceived ART children of another wage earner cannot receive those
benefits.
As the reporter for the UPC provisions on ART children, I’m tempted
to argue that the solution is for all states to enact the UPC,129 but I know
that won’t happen. I do urge more states to do so, not only for purposes of
Social Security survivor benefits but because of the merits of the UPC quite
apart from those benefits.130
The actual solution rests with Congress. In 1939, when Congress added

the child to be dependent upon the wage earner at the time of death. The latter requirement
would not only seem to preclude benefits for an ART child who was conceived
posthumously but also for a child who was in gestation at the time of the wage earner’s
death. In the following passage, the Court basically read this requirement out of the Act: “It
was Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality of cases. It did so here by employing
eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law as a workable substitute for burdensome caseby-case determinations whether the child was, in fact, dependent on her father’s earnings.”
Astrue, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2032.
125
See Astrue, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2032. For the UPC treatment, see UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-120, 2-121.
126
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120.
127
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106.
128
Astrue, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2034.
129
A decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan holding that posthumously conceived
ART children born to the decedent’s widow were not entitled to take by intestacy (and hence
not entitled to Social Security survivor benefits) prompted the Council of the Probate and
Estate Planning Section of the State Bar of Michigan to appoint a committee to study
enactment of the UPC provisions dealing with ART children. I am a member of that
committee. The case is In re Certified Question from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan (Mattison v. Commissioner of Social Security), 825 N.W.2d
566 (Mich. 2012).
130
See Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the ClassGift and Intestacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC
L.J. 30 (2009), also at Univ. of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 171, 2009,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477961.
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the provisions granting survivor rights for children of a deceased wage
earner, the phenomenon of births by means of assisted reproduction was
unheard of, much less the idea of posthumous conception. The first “test
tube baby” was born in England in 1978; the first in the United States in
1981.131 Now that the Supreme Court has spoken so decisively, the results
will continue to vary from state to state until Congress holds hearings on
the question132 and brings the Social Security Act’s survivor benefits
provisions up to date.133
Sometimes state law is neither uniform nor well-enough
developed—and not likely to become so in the foreseeable future—to
govern rights to federal benefits. Such an instance is the right of
posthumously conceived ART children to survivor benefits under the
Social Security Act.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this survey of the creeping federalization of wealth-transfer law, I
found only one area in which the result has been favorable. In all the others,
the result has been detrimental to the administration of justice, including
the one area in which federal law has incorporated state wealth-transfer
law. The responsibility lies with all three branches of the federal
government—legislative, judicial, and executive.
First, the favorable result. The far flung locations of our military

131
See Walter Sullivan, First ‘Test Tube’ Baby Born in U.S., Joining Success Around
W o r l d ,
N . Y .
T I M E S ,
D e c .
2 4 ,
1 9 8 1 ,
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1228.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2013).
132
Congressional hearings, if thorough, would take a hard look at how the UPC
handles the intestacy rights of ART children.
133
Federal authorities other than Congress are capable of a rapid response to new
developments. Although federal benefits for same-sex married couples is a topic that is
outside the scope of this essay, federal authorities have been quick to respond to United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___ (2013), in which the Supreme Court held that the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, which denied federal benefits for same-sex married couples, is
unconstitutional. Federal agencies and courts have acted expeditiously to provide that samesex married couples are entitled to federal benefits even if they are domiciled in a state that
does not recognize same-sex marriages. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that “[f]or
federal tax purposes, the Service adopts a general rule recognizing a marriage of same-sex
individuals that was validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize the marriage of two
individuals of the same sex even if the married couple is domiciled in a state that does not
recognize the validity of same-sex marriages.” The term “state” “means any domestic or
foreign jurisdiction having the legal authority to sanction marriages.” See Rev. Rul. 2013-17,
2013-38 I.R.B. ___ (Sept. 16, 2013). See also I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-72 (Aug. 29,
2013). Other federal agencies, including the Social Security Administration, are expected
to follow suit. See Annie Lowrey, Gay Marriages Get Recognition from the I.R.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A1. A federal district court in California held that the exclusion of
spouses in same-sex marriages from veterans’ benefits is unconstitutional. See Cooper-Harris
v. United States, No. 2:12-00887-CMB (AJWx) (C.D. Calif. Aug. 29, 2013) (order granting
summary judgment).
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personnel, in overseas as well as state-side bases and sometimes in combat
zones, have necessitated preemption of state will-execution formalities. The
federal military-wills statute does not stop at expressly preempting state
will-execution formalities, however. Unlike ERISA, FEGLIA, and the
Treasury Regulations regarding U.S. government securities in survivorship
form, which simply preempt state law without replacing it with any
comparable federal substitute,134 the federal military-will statute
responsibly replaces preempted state will-execution formalities with a wellthought-out set of federal will-execution formalities. The statute also
requires the execution of military wills to be supervised by a military legal
assistance counsel,135 greatly reducing the chance of defective execution.
Apart from military wills, federal action with respect to state wealthtransfer law has led to detrimental results. In the one instance in which
Congress has expressly tied federal benefits to state law, the tie-in now
works an injustice, because the posthumously conceived ART children of
one wage earner can qualify for survivor benefits but the posthumously
conceived ART children of the another wage earner are deprived of
benefits. When Congress long ago expressly tied Social Security survivor
benefits to state intestacy law, the tie-in may have made sense. But, because
of advances in medical technology allowing posthumous conception, the
tie-in is now out of date. Congress needs to bring the Social Security Act’s
out-of-date provisions regarding survivor benefits for posthumously
conceived ART children up to date, so that those federal benefits are
uniform throughout the states instead of being dependent on nonuniform
state intestacy law in this still-emerging field.
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Treasury Department are
responsible for undermining state wealth-transfer law reforms. State law
dealing broadly with questions of wealth transfers has traditionally been
backward and in many instances intent-defeating. The last few decades,
however, have seen efforts largely spearheaded by the ALI and the ULC to
modernize that law. One of the efforts has been to unify the law of probate
and nonprobate transfers. The Supreme Court’s Egelhoff and Hillman
decisions and the Treasury regulations regarding U.S. government
securities in survivorship form have thoughtlessly and needlessly barred the
unification effort for federally authorized or regulated nonprobate
transfers.136
134
Although Professor Meltzer notes that “it is unimaginable that [members of
Congress and congressional staffs] generally would be aware of the relevant array of state
and local laws” (Meltzer, supra note 19, at 15), state wealth-transfer laws are readily
accessible in the Restatements (see supra note 78 & accompanying text). See also Irish &
Cohen, supra note 53.
135
See supra note 93.
136
In some instances, the justices’ analysis has been embarrassingly uninformed. As
Professor Langbein noted: “Federal courts are sometimes unaware of basic principles of the
wealth transfer field, as in Hillman, in which both the majority opinion and a concurrence
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Congress has undermined state wealth-transfer law in the perpetuity
area by granting a tax exemption for perpetual trusts. Unlike the wellthought-out federal statute relating to military wills, the federal tax statute
granted a tax exemption for perpetual trusts by mistake, not by design.137
That Congress has shown little inclination to correct its earlier mistake is
negligent at best and irresponsible at worst.138 The result of its inattention
is that wealth continues to accumulate in perpetually tax-exempt trusts, now
counted in the billions of dollars.139
Because of the raw power granted to the federal government by the
Constitution, federal law is the elephant in the room, even in a traditional
state-law sphere as wealth-transfer law. It is distressing indeed that those
who produce that elephant often—not always, but often—seem oblivious
to the damage they can do and have done to well-considered state law.
Whether the ULC’s position paper urging more care when dealing with
state law140 will carry any weight with federal authorities remains to be
seen. Shakespeare extolled “[t]hey that have power to hurt, and will do
none.”141 Too bad that admonition has not seeped into the collective federal
consciousness when intruding into a field so traditionally the province of
state law.

by Justice Alito voiced the mistaken assumption that a life insurance beneficiary designation
could be altered by will.” Langbein, supra note 6, at 35-36.
137
See Waggoner, supra note 104, at 7-10.
138
Congress has known about the problem at least as early as 2005 and has had several
opportunities to correct its mistake. See id. at 2 n.3. See also id. at 9, 26-30. For a proposed
solution, see id. at 30-33.
139
See id. at 3, 10 n.39.
140
See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, supra note 3.
141
The quotation is from Shakespeare’s Sonnet 94. Shakespeare’s sonnets are readily
accessible on the web (e.g., http://www.shakespeares-sonnets.com/all.php) and in many
collected works (e.g., STEPHEN BOOTH, SHAKESPEARE’S SONNETS (2000)).

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/92

26

